Abstract. For a class of repeated two-person zero-sum games with incomplete reformation it was proved by AUMANN and MASCHLER that lim v. exists, v. being the value of the game with n repetitions. As for the speed of convergence AUMANN and MASCHLER showed that the error term 6. = I vn -lira v
Introduction
Following the introduction by HARSANYI of the concept of games with incomplete information, AUMANlq and MASCHLER and later on MERTENS and ZAMIR treated a certain situation in which a two-person zero-sum game is repeated a large number of times by the same players. The main feature of such a situation is the possibility of each player to collect information, unknown to him but known to the other player, by watching the moves of his opponent. Consequently, each player must be aware of the fact that by his moves he is revealing information to his opponent that may be used against him in a further stage. Optimal strategies of the players in such a multistage game must therefore reflect an optimal speed of revealing information. In the mathematical model this process of revealing and collecting information shows up implicitly through v, the value of the game with n repetitions. (For mathematical convenience v, is defined to be "the value per stage" i.e. the value of the supergame composed of n stages, divided by n).
The main result by AUMANN and MASCHLER (as well as in its generalization by MER~NS and ZAMm) is that v, converges (as n ~ oo) to some constant v which may be called the value of the infinite game. The error term 6, = Iv, 2, ...) gives the speed of convergence of v, to v which is determined implicitly by the flow of information throughout the stages of the game, as the two players play 1) Part of this paper is based on a chapter of the author's Ph.D. thesis done at the Institute of Mathematics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
2) SHM~EL ZAMIR, Department of Mathematics, University of California, Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90024.
optimally. Since usually v can be computed with a reasonable effort while v, is practically impossible to compute for a very large n, 6, has also a very practical importance: To give us the error involved in approximating v, by v.
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the error term 6, more closely. By AUMANN and MASCIJLER and by MERTENS and ZAMIR it was shown that (for the games treated there) 6, _< e/V~for some constant c. Our first task will be to show that this is a sharp estimation for the order of magnitude of 6,, by demonstrating an example of a game in which 6, >_ c,/[/n-for some positiveconstant c'. In such a game v, converges to v at the slowest (order of magnitude) speed possible. There are however games in which the convergence is much faster e.g. c' (log n)/n <_ 6, < c (log n)/n or even c'/n < 6. < e/n. We shall give two sufficient conditions, one for each of the above properties, and we shall also give examples of such games.
Although the works of HARSANYI, AUMANN and MASCHLER, and MERTENS and ZAMIR are very relevant and very important background for this research, we tried to make this paper self contained. Familiarity with the above mentioned references is not a requirement for understanding this paper.
I am indebted to R. J. AUMANN for many helpful discussions and to M. MASCH-LER for his advice about the representation of the material. I would also like to thank A. PAZY and T. S. FERGUSON for valuable remarks on the proof of Lemma 3.
The Class of Games
For the purposes of this paper it will be sufficient for us to look at a subfamily of the games considered by MERTENS and ZAMm, namely the subfamily of 9ames with lack of information on one side. These are the games treated by AUMANN and MASCHLER and can be described as follows: ~p*= 1 t and for each positive integer n, consider the game F, (p) played as It J follows: Chance chooses one of the k games {A *} assigning to A ~ the probability p*. Player I is then informed of chance's choice but player II is not. The game chosen by chance is then played n times; after each play both players are informed of the move made by the other player but not of the payoff. (Player I can, of course, deduce the payoff from the strategy choices made by himself and the other player, since he knows which game is actually being played.) The payoff in F, (p) is defined to be the sum of the payoffs in the n individual plays of the game chosen by chance, divided by n. Both players of course know the rules of F,(p) as described above.
We shall describe the specifications of such a game schematically by: (This follows, of course, from the more general results of MERTENS and ZAMIR; (i) is a special case of Theorem 2.1 while (ii) is a special case of Theorem 4.5). It wilt be very convenient to use throughout this paper the following terminology and notation which is slightly different from the usual one.
Definition
Let {a,} and {b.) be two sequences of nonnegative real numbers. They will be said to be of the same order of ma#nitude if there are cl > 0, Ce > 0 such that CEb . ~ a, < clb, for n = 1,2,.... The relation between 6n(P) and 1/]/~ has the following probabilistic interpretation: Let us specialize to the case k = 2, l = 2 and u*(p) = u(p); a similar discussion applies in general. Since lim v.(p) = u*(p) = u(p), in the limit as n ~ player I can not obtain more than u(p) which is what he can guarantee by disregarding his additional information and playing identically in both games. Nevertheless player I can generally obtain more than u(p) in F,(p) for any finite n. In order to do this he has to play differently in the two possible games. In other words he has to deviate from an extreme non-revealing strategy. How much can he deviate and how much can he gain by this deviation? Let (s, 1 -s) be player I's optimal mixed strategy in A (p) (i.e. I plays his first pure strategy with probability s and his second pure strategy with probability 1 -s(0 < s < 1)). By its definition, when this strategy is played repeatedly in the n stages of F,(p) player I guarantees u(p). If player I in fact does this, the actual choice of pure strategy made by him can be regarded as a Bernoulli trial with probabilities s, 1 -s. The proportion of times that the first pure strategy is played in n such trials distributes approximately normally around the mean s with a standard deviation of the order of 1/V~. Therefore if player I wishes to "cheat" player II by making use of the additional information (i.e. playing different mixed strategies in the two possible games) without enabling him to detect it, he may do this in such a way that this proportion will fall within the limits of few standard deviations i.e. c/Vnfrom s. Any deviation of higher order will be detected and used by player II to hold the payoff to a number smaller than u(p). Clearly a deviation of order not higher than 1/I/n-from the optimal strategy (s, 1 -s) will make a deviation in the payoff in F,(p) which is also of order not higher than 1/]/~.
The existence of games with 6, = 0* (1/~), which is the main result of this paper, implies that there are games in which player I can exhaust the whole probabilistic deviation mentioned above. In other games he may be able to exhaust only a small part of it such as 0"(~ ---n) or 0" (nl--).
A Recursion Formula
We start with a useful formula giving v, + 1 (P) in terms of v, (p). Let S = {a = (st, ..., s,) I s~ > 0, i = 1,...,l, S]si = 1} and T= {z = (tl ..... t,,)l tj _> 0,j = 1, ..., m; STtj = 1} be the sets of mixed strategies of player I and II respectively in {A~}. Denote by S* the k-th cartesian power of ~. i.e. S* = S k = S x ... x S.
Finally let e, for i = 1 ..... m, be the i-th unit column in T.
Lemma I.
For every p e P and for n = 1,2,.... we can assume that player II knows the strategy chosen by player I in F~+ ~ (p). In particular we assume that player II knows 0-*. After the first stage as he is informed which pure strategy i was chosen by player I, player II calculates the probability vector p~ = (p~,..., p~) where p~ is his new conditional probability for the event "chance has chosen A:', given i, o-* and p. Clearly p~ is given by (2) and the probability of obtaining p~ is the total probability that player I chooses i which is ~.
After the first stage, therefore, the situation is equivalent to the following: Chance has chosen one of the games {A ~} according to the probability distribution p~. Player I is informed which game was chosen and player II is not. The game chosen by chance has to be played n times. In other words, after the first stage, the players will face one of the games F~ (p~) ... F~ (p~) (with probabilities w g~ respectively, and hence Pi has to be defined only for i s.t. sir 0). By playing optimally in F, (p~) (i = I,..., l), player I guarantees an expected payoff of n v, (p~) for the coming n stages. Thus, by maximizing with respect to 0-* we have:
--/'~ ~-~ a*eX*kl_<j_<mv=l ~iq:O On the other hand, knowing a*, player II can guarantee
and since by the minimax theorem we can assume that he knows ~*, we get also the opposite inequality of (3) and hence the lemma is proved.
Notation.
Since throughout this paper we will use summations of the form ~" ~7i q0i where i=l ~e0 l ~0i is usually not defined when w = 0 we will write this in short as ~i~0i and keep in mind that the summation is only over i such that ~ r 0. i= 1 
/'1 (p) is the game:
for 0_p_l. Theorem 2.
In the above described game:
v~(p)>pp'/]//n; 0<p< 1 for n= 1,2 .....
Proof.
In the special case under consideration ~ = {(s,s') 10 < s G 1}, Z* = ~ x ~ = ((s,s'),(t, t') ] 0 < s < 1 ; 0 < t < 1 }. It is more convenient to use L and R for the pure strategies of player I and hence we shall write PL and PR instead of Pl and P2.
So we can rewrite (2) for our game as:
ps ps'
Let us now prove (4) by induction on n: For n = 1, va (p) = min (p,p') >__ pp' in accordance with (4). Assume that (4) is true for n and let us prove it for n + 1.
For p = 0 or p' = 0 clearly v,+ 1 (P) = 0 in accordance with (4) so assume pp' r 0.
By the recursion formula (1) and by (5) (s -s') . (8) By (5) and (7) we have g = s' = 89 = 2ps;pR = 2ps'.
From (6) we get by (8) and (9)
and using the induction hypothesis we have:
O_<s_<l n "~-1 1 p-~a < 1 (10)
As a result of simple maximization in (10) we get the following values for s:
Case a.
'For (1/4 l/~) -< p _< 1 -(1/4 l/n) we take So = 89 + (1/8 p [/~) (which will be in the domain of maximization) and we easily get by (10): Corollary. By combining Theorems 1 and 2 we have that the error term fin(P) of the game under consideration satisfies pp,/V-ff < 6,(p) <-c/~'n for some constant c, and hence 6, = 0*(1/Vn). In other words 0(1/1/~) is in the general case the least upper bound for the order of magnitude of 6,.
A Sufficient Condition for 6. = 0 (l~ n )
After the example in the last section establishing the existence of games with error term equal to 0* (1/V-n), we turn in this section to games with a much smaller 
Using (2) we obtain:
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 3.
Let v(p) be a function defined on P, v"(p) exists and satisfies the condition of l Theorem 3. For any peP and every convex combination ~q~Pt = P,
For the purpose of this proof only, for any p = (pl, ... ,pk)~_ p we denote by/~ the vector (pl,..., pk-1)e E k-1. It is easily verified that if p and q are in P, then -01l >-lip -ql] 2. where ~i = Pi + cq(p -Pi) for some cq; 0 _< ~i < 1. Hence:
Since I1 ,11 = 1 we get:
Now (12) is obtained by multiplying the last equation by ~oi and summing on i, (recalling that Z] ~p, = 1 and r] q~,(,t3i -iO) = 0).
Proof of Theorem 3. " 1
Since it is well known that r=~lr = 0 (log n), the theorem will follow from the inequality:
7/ n-1~
where kn = ~--, n = 2,3, ... kl and ~ being constants.
r=l r
We prove (13) by induction on n: Choose kl large enough to make (13) true for ( n = 1. Let ~ = Max kl, --2--n-n ! where c is the constant determined by Lemma 2.
By (1) and Lemma 2, we have: ',~i[lp -pill + giv,(pl) 9 rl q-1 a*e,~* i= 1
Assuming now that (13) is true for n and using the fact that u(p) < v(p) we obtain:
and by Lemma 3: In the above example 6,(p)= 0* (2-~n).
To prove the theorem it is sufficient to prove the following proposition:
Proposition.
In the above example Since k~--~-=, and k~'--~-r ~'r=l =J are bounded and it is also well known that n--1 1 k=~l-~-= 0* (log n), it follows that B, = 0* (log n) and therefore pp'n (B, -A,) = wh ch,ves theorem si. e we a,
Proof of the proposition.
F1 (P) is the game: L R RL RR p'/
and its value vl(p) = min(p,p'), 0 < p < 1.
So for n = 1, vl (19) > pp' in accordance to (15). We proceed by induction on n. Assume (15) is true for n. Since for pp' = 0 (15) is trivially true for n + 1 we assume p # I and p # 0, then by Lemma 1 (using the same notations as in Section 3) (is) 
+I).
Consider now the two cases:
so_<land p so p'
in (18) and therefore by (18) and (22): + n-~l (B.+a -A.+I) .
This completes the induction step for this case.
_< I which means that s o is in the domain of the maximization (n+ I +B.+I-A.)
So > I or pso p' > 1 (i.e. So is out of the domain of the maximization in (18)).
S. ZAMIR
We claim that in this case:
In fact:
We notice that go(p') = p1)'(n + 1 + Bn). Applying (23) we obtain:
Inserting this in (18) gives:
This completes the proof of the proposition and hence also the proof of Theorem 4. Note that the proof of the proposition suggests a constructive way to calculate a strategy for player I in/'.rio) that guarantees him an error term of the highest order of magnitude possible. (Namely, calculate so, consider the two cases etc.) We may call such a strategy "essentially optimal".
Games with = 0* (l/n)
In this section we introduce a family of games for which 6n = 0* (l/n). For such games the sum of the total payoff to player I beyond v(p), in all the stages of the game, is bounded.
Theorem 5. 1) 1 .,41 Let ~:~Ak be a repeated game with incomplete information in which v(1)) -u(p) >_ e > 0 for every p in P which is not an extreme point, then:
n for n = 1,2,... where e is a constant.
The theorem follows easily from the following two lemmas:
Lemma 4. is not an extreme point of P).
Proof
By (11) in the proof of Lemma 2:
Lemma 5.
For any p ~ P and a* = (a a ..... o -k) s X* the following inequality holds:
for v = 1 ..... k, where g~ and Pi are defined by (2) and s~* is defined by (25).
If p is an extreme point of P, inequality (26) is clearly true; if this is not the case, we recall our notation that all summations over i are only over those i's for which gl ~ 0, so that by (2) we obtain: Hence noticing that ~ s[ = y' s~* = 1 we obtain finally:
If p is an extreme point of P then, and only then, ~p'(1 -p~) = 0 and (24) i=1 k is trivially true for any ~. Assume from now on that ~2 f(l -p~) r 0. Choose v--1 2c 2 > 0 such that (24) holds for n = 1, and such that c~ >_ --where c is the cone stant determined by Lemma 2. For such an ~ we now prove (24) by induction on n. For n = 1 it is true by definition of c~. Assume it is true for n and let us prove it for n + 1. By Lemma 1 und Lemma 4 we have:
Applying the induction hypothesis we have:
+ ~ E e, ZVpr(1 -pr) 9 i=1 v=l (27) Let x ~ = max Is7 -s~* I then by Lemma 5:
on the other hand a E Is~ -sr*i < akx ~ = cxL So by (27): 
Discussion
The main result of this paper is given by Theorem 2 which proves the existence of games with error term of the.order of 1/~, the highest order possible according to MERTENS and ZAMIR and AUMANN and MASCHLER. We denote by Pi (i = 1 ..... n) the conditional probability assigned by player II, at the end of stage i, to the event "chance has chosen A x,,. It was shown both by MERTENS and ZAMIR and by AUMANN and MASCHLER that given the strategy of is a constant and E denotes the expectation. By this inequality we deduce the following corollary of Theorem 2:
Corollary.
There exists a constant c > 0 such that for any n, n = 1,2, ..., and for any Pl, 0 < px < 1, there exists a Martingale {Pi}; 0 < Pi < 1; i = 1, ...,n such that: This is an interesting result in itself, since it is well known that for any bounded Martingale {pi}; E Pi+l -Pi = 0( . i A second important result in the present paper is the inductive construction of "essentially optimal" strategies for player I in F,(p) suggested in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 4. Though by some simple arguments it is possible to find the error terms of some games, which do not satisfy the conditions of Theorems 3 and 5, there does not exist a general method of determining the error term of any given game. We conclude this paper by an example of a game whose error term cannot be found by the theorems stated in this paper, and in fact we do not know its error term:
Consider the game
